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being	 constituted	 by	 ongoing	 social	 relationships.	My	 central	 claim	
is	 that	 the	reproduction	of	power	 involves	fictional	expectations	ori-
ented	toward	an	open	future.	This	is,	I	argue,	a	crucial	implication	of	
power’s	 social	 constitution,	and	 I	elaborate	 it	 in	 this	paper	with	 the	
hope	that	this	will	help	us	make	sense	of	some	of	the	deep	disagree-
ments	about	power.	
If	 power	 is	 socially	 constituted,	we	need	 to	 look	at	 the	activities	
that	constitute	it	if	we	want	to	understand	its	way	of	being.	I	therefore	
1.	 See	Lukes	(2005)	and	Haugaard	(2010)	for	similar	assessments.





















































of	power.	 In	Hobbes’s	myth,	 individuals	 empower	 the	 sovereign	by	
misrecognizing her	as	already	having	an	independent,	robust	capacity	
to	 implement	and	enforce	her	commands.	Developing	this	 idea	will	
help	us	 recognize	 the	central	 role	 that	fictional	expectations	play	 in	
the	reproduction	of	power.	In	addition,	the	mythical	form	of	Hobbes’s	
account	 is	 instructive.	 Since	 power	 requires	 ongoing	 social	 support	






tension	between	 conceiving	power	 as	 socially	 constituted	 and	 char-
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which	conceives	power	as	 the	 “human	ability	 […]	 to	act	 in	 concert”	
(1970,	p.	44).	For	Arendt,	power	 is	based	on	 the	collective	ability	 to	
coordinate	actions	around	shared	values,	goals,	and	rules.	Consensual	
theories	have	been	criticized	for	failing	to	account	for	coercion,	exploi-
tation,	 and	manipulation	—	that	 is,	 for	power’s	 role	 in	 social	 conflict	
(see	 Lukes	 2005,	 pp.	 32–5).	 Consensual	 theories	would	 need	 to	 ex-
plain	how	social	cooperation	could	be	robust	enough	to	persist	in	the	
case	of	conflict,	and	it	is	not	clear	how	they	can	do	that.















































This	 tension	 is	 reflected	 in	 the	contrast	between	consensual	and	
conflictual	theories	of	power	(see	Haugaard	2010;	Haugaard	&	Ryan	



























sider	 the	pragmatic	 character	of	 representations	of	power	as	 robust,	





3. Hobbes’s Myth of Instituting Power 
If	power	is	constituted	by	ongoing	social	relationships,	we	need	to	un-
derstand	how	 these	 relationships	are	continuously	 reproduced.	The	
reproduction	of	power,	I	will	argue,	involves	fictional	expectations	ori-
ented	toward	an	open	future.	When	we	ascribe	power	to	an	agent	in	









an	 institution	 and,	 in	 particular,	 continue	 to	 accept	 it	when	 it	 exer-
cises	power	 in	ways	 that	 conflict	with	 the	 individuals’	 interests	 and	
goals?	While	Searle	suggests	that	many	social	institutions	“tend	to	be	
in	 everybody’s	 interest”	 (p.	 207),	 he	 concedes	 that	 this	 is	 not	 a	 per-
suasive	 response	 in	 the	 case	 of	 power,	which	 can	be	used	 to	 affect	
agents	even	when	it	is	not	in	their	interest.8	The	underlying	problem	is	
that	Searle	effectively	thinks	of	power	as	a	static	feature,	treating	ques-




















“grudging	 acknowledgment,	 even	 the	 acknowledgment	 that	 one	 is	 simply	











be	skeptical	 that	 such	an	origin	can	be	coherently	 imagined	or	 that	
doing	so	 is	useful	 for	a	general	account	of	power,	 issues	 to	which	 I	
will	return.13	But	if	we	could	imagine	it,	it	could	help	us	identify	what	






















in	which	 robust	 power	 has	 already	 been	 created.	 The	 origin	 story	 plays	 a	





































ticular,	Hoekstra	 focuses	on	whether	Hobbes	believed	 that	 the	possession	
of	the	requisite	de facto	power	is	sufficient	for	legitimate	de jure	authority.	My	
argument	in	this	paper	does	not	require	taking	a	stand	on	this	issue.	
12.	 See	Field	 (2014,	p.	 62,	 fns.	 5,	 8).	 Field	 argues	 that	 this	 “juridical”	 approach	
to	Hobbes’s	political	 philosophy	 is	 incomplete	 since	 “[i]t	 is	not	 enough	 to	
defend	a	doctrine	of	the	authorized	power	of	the	sovereign;	such	a	doctrine	










of	 the	multitude	are	unified,	 thereby	making the	multitude	a	unified	
person:
A	Multitude	 of	men,	 are	made	One	 Person,	 when	 they	
are	by	one	man,	or	one	Person,	Represented;	 so	 that	 it	
be	done	with	the	consent	of	every	one	of	that	Multitude	




















To	 align	my	 actions	with	 others’,	 I	 need	 assurance	 that	 they	will	
continue	to	act	in	ways	that	I	can	anticipate.	In	the	absence	of	some	
kind	of	pre-established	harmony,	the	formation	of	stable	expectations	
requires	 the	prospect	 that	 fundamental	behavioral	expectations	will	
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multitude.20	While	 the	sovereign’s	actions	are	attributed	 to	 the	now-
unified	multitude	 (the	 “commonwealth”),	 the	commitments	 that	 the	











already-existing,	 robust	 capacity	 helps	 bring	 about	 a	 unified	 social	








4. Empowerment Through Pretense 
Hobbes	suggests	that	representing	power	helps	to	create	power.	What	







21.	 Fleming	 (2017)	 provides	 an	 overview,	 suggesting	 that	 “most	 scholars	 […]	
now	agree	that	Hobbes’s	state	is	a	person	by	fiction	[…]”	(p.	1).	
who	 represents	herself	 in	 court,	 for	 example,	 is	 a	natural	 person	 in	
this	sense.	Artificial persons	act	on	behalf	of	others;	their	speech	and	
actions	 are	 attributed	 to	 the	 person	 they	 represent.	 A	 lawyer	 repre-
senting	her	client,	for	example,	is	an	artificial	person.	Representation	
for	Hobbes	 is	 thus	a	 relationship	of	 accountability:	Natural	persons	
are	accountable	for	their	own	actions,	while	an	artificial	person	acts	
on	account	of	 those	 she	 represents.	To	 further	 characterize	 the	 rela-
tionship	between	artificial	persons	and	those	they	represent,	Hobbes	


















to	 the	 collective	 she	 represents.	But	 the	multitude	 is	not	 capable	of	




artificial	 person	 and	 the	 disagreements	 in	 the	 literature	 about	 its	 precise	
meaning.	
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precise	 character	 of	 which	 we	 can	 unpack	 using	 Louis	 Althusser’s	












who	comply	with	 its	 commands.	By	 responding	as	 if	 I	were	already,	
independently,	 the	obedient	 subject	 I	 am	called	on	as	being,	 I	help	
reproduce	the	social	order	that	gives	the	officer	effective	power	and	
authority.25	In	other	words,	I	misrecognize	the	source	of	the	officer’s	
24.	 The	discussion	below	draws	on	 the	 insightful	 interpretation	of	Althusser’s	
account	in	Kukla’s	(2000,	2002,	2002a)	work.
25.	 It	 gives	 the	 officer	 power	 and authority	 if	 having	 de facto	 power	 is	 central	
to	(though	maybe	not	sufficient	 for)	having	authority.	 In	the	act	of	 turning	
around,	I	help	constitute	the	social	order	underlying	the	officer’s	power	by	




not	 adequately	 serve	Hobbes’s	 justificatory	 project.22	 Legitimate	 po-
litical	authority	requires	that	the	sovereign	has	the	requisite	ability	to	






























of	misrepresentation	or	 imagination.	I	can	act	as if money	had	stable	value	
even	though	I	know	that	money’s	value	 is	 likely	 to	fluctuate	(see	section	6	
below).
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the	 individuals	who	create	power	pretend	 that	 it	already exists	 inde-
pendently.	Similarly,	in	Althusser’s	example,	the	police	officer	appears	
as	 a	 mythical	 figure	 with	 an	 already	 existing,	 independent	 author-
ity.	 The	 reproduction	 of	 power	 involves	 imagining	 a	 mythical	 past	
in	which	power	already	exists.	This	past	is	mythical	not	because	it	is	






























als	participate	 in	 the	social	alignment	 that	 is	 the	basis	 for	 the	sover-
eign’s	ability	to	provide	protection.	The	individuals	of	 the	multitude	
misrecognize	 themselves	 as	 already being	 vulnerable	 to	 sovereign	
power	since	it	is,	in	fact,	their	recognition	that	constitutes	this	power.	
In	other	words,	the	pre-political	individuals	in	Hobbes’s	myth	are	pre-

































might	ask	how	a	mythical story	 could	provide	any	 insights	 into	 the	
ontology	of	 power.	To	 answer	 this	 question,	 I	will	 discuss	 the	prag-
matic	function	of	Hobbes’s	myth	and	consider	how	its	complex	struc-
ture	serves	 that	 function.	Drawing	on	Quill	R.	Kukla’s	 (published	as	















judge	 that	 it	will	not	 continue,	 the	 social	 alignment	would	collapse.	











through	 signs	 and	 symbolic	 practices	 (uniforms,	 documents,	 titles,	
etc.),	educational	institutions	that	inculcate	habits	of	obedience,	spec-
tacles	of	violence,	etc.27	The	sovereign	needs	to	rely	on	other	agents	



















does	not	provide	a	satisfying	way	out	of	 the	state	of	nature.	 I	argue	 in	sec-
tion	5	below	that	the	legitimizing	function	of	Hobbes’s	myth	does	not	require	






[…]	although	Hobbes’s	 theory	 instructs	 the	people	 that	





















not	 fully	 dispense	with	 the	 idea	 that	 power	 is	 self-sufficient;	 rather,	







two	alternative	myths.	Hobbes	alludes	 to	 these	myths	 in	Leviathan’s 
dedication,	where	he	 suggests	 that	he	 is	 trying	 to	avoid	both	views	
“that	contend,	on	one	side	for	too	great	Liberty,	and	on	the	other	side	
for	too	much	Authority”	(Hobbes	1996,	p.	3).	The	former	locates	the	











Hobbes’s	 legitimation	myth	 does	 not	 characterize	 power	 as	 self-






















empowerment.	Hobbes	 suggests	 that	 consent	 is	necessary	 for	 legiti-




























on	 compliance,	 they	are	more	 likely	 to	 fail	 to	do	 their	part	 in	 constituting	
social	order.
of	social	reality,	we	can	recognize	that	it	plays	an	important	role	in	the	




claim	 that	power	 is	 spontaneously	 created	 through	cooperation,	we	
treat	the	necessary	social	alignment	as	a	given	and	forget	the	role	that	
representations	of	 social	 unity	play	 in	 the	 alignment’s	 reproduction.	
The	continuous	reproduction	of	social	alignments	requires	that	agents	
are	 assured	 of	 continued	 cooperation.	 Thus,	 no	 chronologically	 co-
herent	story	can	locate	the	origin	of	power	in	a	spontaneous	event	of	
cooperation.	Whenever	we	try	to	imagine	such	an	origin,	we	realize	





ent	 chronological	 story	 is	not	a	flaw	 in	Hobbes’s	myth.	Rather	 than	
being	a	literal	description	of	power’s	origin,	 it	serves	its	 legitimizing	
function	by	calling	on	its	readers	to	participate	in	creating	the	social	
unity	 necessary	 for	 political	 power	 and	 authority.	 Hobbes	 believes	
that	individuals	can	align	their	actions	to	guarantee	peace	only	if	they	
see	 themselves	as	already	bound	 to	align	 them	 in	a	way	 that	 is	not	
ultimately	up	to	them.32	This	is	why	Hobbes	rejects	the	second	myth	
he	mentions	in	the	Leviathan’s	dedication,	the	idea	that	the	origin	of	
power	 is	 the	people,	understood	as	a	 freestanding	entity	with	an	 in-
dependent	capacity	to	form	a	will	and	act	(see	Skinner	1999,	pp.	24–7).	













































theory	 fails	 to	 explore	 the	 normative	 implications	 of	 white	 racial	
domination,	 conquest,	 and	violence,	 all	 of	which	have	been	 central	
to	the	making	of	 the	modern	world	(2009,	p.	173).	The	above	analy-
sis	 suggests	 that	 the	claim	about	society’s	cooperative	nature	masks	
a	demand	 to	 continue	 cooperating.	Moreover,	 since	 it	 characterizes	
this	cooperative	nature	as	a	fixed	fact,	the	consensual	social	ontology	











Hobbes’s	 origin	myth	 is	 instructive	not	 because	 it	 could	help	 us	
locate	the	origin	of	power	but	because	it	draws	our	attention	to	a	dif-
ferent	pragmatic	role	of	conceptions	of	power.	Neither	the	appeal	to 
power	as	a	 robust	 capacity	 that	Hobbes’s	mythical	 individuals	must	
make	nor	Hobbes’s	own	appeal	 to	consent	should	be	 read	as	 literal	
descriptions	of	social	reality. Instead,	they	play	a	performative	role	in	
Hobbes’s	call	on	readers	to	reproduce	power	by	acting	as	if	it	already	
existed	 independently	 of	 their	 actions. Since	 power	 requires	 ongo-
ing	 social	 support	and	 legitimation,	 it	 should	not	be	 surprising	 that	
the	 structure	 of	 power-legitimizing	 myths	 is	 central	 to	 understand-
ing	 power.	With	 that	 in	mind,	we	 can	 reevaluate	 the	 apparent	 con-
flict	between	consensual	and	conflictual	theories	of	power.	On	their	
face,	these	theories	are	usually	formulated	as	attempts	to	describe	or	




Because	 they	 have	 constitutive	 effects,	 idealized	 expectations	 of	
monetary	stability	need	not	necessarily	be	false	or	unjustified.	A	stable	
monetary	 future	 comes	 about	 if	 and	because	 enough	 agents	 act	 on	
these	expectations.	 If	banks	are	not	convinced	of	a	stable	economic	
future,	 they	are	 less	 likely	to	enter	 into	debt-contracts,	with	the	con-



























devaluation	of	money	 through	 inflation	has	 to	be	 slow	and	predict-
able	 (Beckert	 2016,	p.	 106).	Older	monetary	 systems	 tried	 to	 secure	
this	expectation	by	tying	monetary	value	to	objects	presumed	to	have	












The	 projection	 of	 future	monetary	 stability	 relies	 on	 an	 idealiza-
tion	that	disregards	possible	futures	in	which	money	fails	to	retain	its	
value.	The	monetary	future	is	uncertain	in	the	sense	that	actors	cannot	
fully	understand	all	 the	relevant	 factors	 influencing	the	 future	value	
of	money	 (Beckert	 2016,	 p.	 45).	 Even	 reasonable	 confidence	 in	 the	
stability	of	money	can	be	disappointed	in	unexpected	financial	crises.	
Moreover,	the	successful	maintenance	of	money’s	value	requires	the	
continuous	 efforts	 of	 central	 banks	 as	well	 as	 governments,	 private	
banks,	credit-rating	agencies,	etc.	(Ingham	2008,	p.	79).	But	since	we	
need	 to	 assume	 a	 future	 in	which	money	 retains	 its	 value	 to	 use	 it	
intelligibly,	the	possibility	that	these	efforts	fail,	as	they	sometimes	do,	
has	to	be	disregarded.	As	John	Beckert	puts	it:	“[…]	to	create	belief	in	
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tions	are	directed	is	uncertain.	Empowerment	is	not	a	literal	transfer	






























































will	 continue	 to	be	able	 to	affect	others’	 actions	 in	 the	 future,	what-
ever	 else	may	 happen.36	 But	 the	 future	 toward	which	 such	 expecta-
36.	 In	 Hobbes’s	myth,	 individuals	 have	 to	 act	 as	 if	 everyone	will	 continue	 to	
support	 the	 sovereign	 if	 the	 need	 arises,	 even	 in	 cases	 of	 conflict	 or	 resis-
tance.	Hampton	(1986),	for	example,	emphasizes	the	role	of	future-oriented	
expectations:	 “[…]	 the	sovereign-elect	can	use	 the prospect of future selective 
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7. Pretense in Everyday Power Ascriptions
As	we	navigate	the	social	world,	we	frequently	experience	power	as	
something	that	exists	independently	of	our	own	attitudes	or	actions,	
something	 that	 can	negatively	affect	us	and	 is	 recalcitrant	 to	our	 re-
sistance.	We	might	be	able	to	criticize,	circumvent,	or	fight	it,	but	we	
still	must	navigate	it.	In	other	words,	ordinary	power	ascriptions	seem	
to	be	recognitions	of	existing	social	 facts.	 In	this	 last	section,	 I	want	








a	police	officer	 stops	me	and	demands	 identification,	 I	 am	 likely	 to	
comply	because	I	take	the	officer	to	have	power	over	me.	The	officer’s	




















exercise	 unnecessary;	 that	 this	 architectural	 apparatus	
should	be	a machine for creating and sustaining a power rela-
tion independent of the person who exercises it.	(Foucault	1977,	
p.	201,	emphasis	added)38 
But	the	image	of	a	“machine	of	power”	ascribes	a	unity	to	the	ar-
rangement	 to	which	no	 real	 practice	 can	 live	 up.39	Real-world	 disci-






havior,	 and	by	doing	 so,	 they	 add	 themselves	 to	 a	 social	 alignment	
that	constitutes	power.	As	Foucault	puts	this	point:	“The	prison	is	[…]	
a	machine	whose	convict-workers	are	both	the	cogs	and	the	products”	
(p.	242).	The	 image	of	a	machine	of	power	 is	built	 into	the	material	
structure	of	disciplinary	practices,	and	while	social	reality	can	never	
fully	 live	up	 to	 it,	 it	nonetheless	helps	 to	 constitute	power.	As	with	






structure	of	 the	Panopticon,	 see,	 for	 example,	 pp.	 164,	 177,	 242.	By	 empha-
sizing	this	machine	metaphor,	Foucault	is	explicating	the	self-understanding	
that	organizes	disciplinary	practices,	not	using	the	machine	metaphor	him-
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undermines	the	support	from	other	agents.	It	is	always	an	open	ques-





















































tion	as	powerful.	 If	 the	officer	or	 the	police	 fail	 to	answer	 this	 chal-
lenge,	this	may	give	others	reason	to	engage	in	similar	challenges.	An	











threats	 are	 risky;	 their	 enforcement	may	 fail	 or	 be	 so	 severe	 that	 it	
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strength.	As	such,	 it	 is	never	simply	present;	 rather,	 it	essentially	 in-





power	 ascriptions	 involve	fictional	 expectations	oriented	 toward	an	
open	 future.	 Social	 interactions	 are	 premised	 upon	 an	 ontology	 of	
power	as	a	robust	capacity,	even	though	social	reality	can	never	fully	
live	up	to	it.	Acting	on	this	premise	helps	to	reproduce	the	social	rela-
tions	on	which	power	 is	based.	Power	 is	never	 simply	grounded	 in	
expectations	 is	not	 to	assess	 their	 truth	or	 justification	but	rather	 to	
















it	—	to	 use	 a	 different	metaphor	 commonly	 used	 for	 power	—	like	 a	
material	resource	that	is	ready	to	be	picked	up	and	put	to	use.	Social	













anisms,	or	material	 resources.	But	while	 these	are,	 strictly	 speaking,	
misrepresentations,	they	have	constitutive	effects.	It	is	this	insight	into	
















Towards	an	Investigation).”	In	Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays, 
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a	present	structure;	 it	 is	always	based	on	 imaginative	projections	of	
future	stability.
I	 situated	my	 account	 by	 comparing	 it	 to	 two	 common	ways	 of	
thinking	about	the	ontology	of	power.	Conflictual	theories	conceive	
power	as	a	robust	capacity	that	can	be	used	to	prevail	in	conflict,	while	

























flowing	 from	a	political	center	but	 is	exercised	within	 local	 relation-
ships	—	for	example,	between	prisoners	and	guards,	or	between	stu-
dents	and	teachers.	But	its	reproduction	requires	that	individuals	act	
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